Communist Party of Sudan

A Paper Presented to the NDALC Meeting
Kampala - November 1999

Proposal for the Meeting to adopt:

(1) Returning to the Asmara agenda and revising the NDA line of strategy.
(2) A realistic Program of Action for NDA activity in the next period.

INTRODUCTION

Since the beginning of this year and as a result of external and internal
pressures, a speech about the political solution overshadowed the NDALC agenda
and monopolized the leadership political and media activities at the time the
other options of popular uprising and armed struggle were made to retreat. This
retreat came as follows:-

1/ The NDALC decisions of Asmara, June 1999, that detailed the enforcement of
the Uprising, NDA at home, and armed struggle were not implemented.

2/ A regrettable state of the performance of NDALC bodies and weakening of the
campaign that actively started to reform it.

(*) The last meeting of the NDALC in Cairo, October 1999, laid suitable agenda;
but we consumed all three days of the meetings discussing nomination of our
delegates to the preparatory committee. There is nothing more to show that the
political solution, even its minute details, has overridden our concerns.

This dedication to the task of nominating delegates almost took us to the brink
of division although this task was nothing but a secondary point that did not
need any further discussion had the "conditions of preparing a conducive
atmosphere" as NDALC already required with full regional and international
public support, been fulfilled.

Of course, "we did not find the time" to discuss the other agenda, including
the political situation at home and abroad, evaluation and enforcement of the
NDA options, the development of a comprehensive political solution since Asmara
and Tripoli, etc. All this is a state of affairs that is self-explanatory!

(*) Today, as we move to Kampala in a new important development of our
relations with friends, we hope to correct the malfunctioning of our top agenda
and the performance of our leadership apparatus. In the NDALC meeting this last
June, we repeatedly emphasized that NDA is prone to use all forms and means of
struggle to remove the Islamic Front's dictatorship as the sole main condition
to achieve aspirations and interests of the people of Sudan. What is required
is for the Kampala meeting to renew this assurance by returning to the Asmara
agenda, rearranging priorities of the NDA line of strategy through activation
of the NDA previous decisions, and providing for the means to implement them
through revision and reform of the executive performance of the NDA bodies.

REVISING THE NDA STRATEGIC PRIORITIES

There is no disagreement at all on the conditions of the regime which
confusingly dashes into a final collapse while trying in vain to find a
solution to its crisis. It is not possible to ignore the wide possibilities for
political work by the masses at home that exploded during the foregoing period,
especially after the Memorandum of December 29, 1998, and activities
thereafter.

These activities achieved political success and opened the path for new forms
of political action at home. It confused the regime and paralyzed it from using
its suppressive machinery.

Reading over this reality should lead to a logical conclusion that the priority
of opposition's tactics abroad must continue to reinforce the Uprising at home.
With such direction comes the development and escalation of armed struggle
simultaneously with the frustration of any attempt to divide NDA unity or
reduce the role and efficiency of NDA integrity.

Our adherence to this strategy will take us to victory for the cause of our
people either by a fall down of the regime under strokes of the Uprising and
armed struggle or a political peaceful and democratic solution based on this
escalated attack. This will achieve the same targets we are struggling for
through the Uprising and armed work. With such understanding, the democratic
peaceful solution would be part of the NDA line of strategy that is the right
place as far as priorities of the opposition tactics are concerned.

(1) Concerning the Task of Reinforcing the Uprising at Home:
We take up our role abroad with a view that NDA at home is making the effort to
broaden its political mobilization beyond the existing barriers of the
authority in order to act effectively in the battle of reinstating democratic
rule, ensuring public freedoms, and paralyzing the repressive tools of the
regime.

The NDA at home will be involved in this battle in its own right in accordance
with modalities it proposes and executes. From abroad, we have to empower the
NDA at home to make its way through a clear and united political letter that
removes any frustration among our masses towards the NDA and provides for
sufficient material aid.

In this context, we discuss with the NDA Leadership at home ways to promote the
requirements of "preparing the conducive atmosphere to the peaceful solution"
to make of it an arena for a broad popular action against the existing
dictatorship for the sake of democracy and peace.

(2) Concerning the Reinforcement and Development of Armed Struggle:
There is no alternative other than execution of the NDALC Asmara meeting this
last June on the unity, reinforcement, and promotion of the NDA armed struggle.
On the other side, we must take a pause on the incidence of exploding the
pipelines near Atbara. The stances of political forces were different
concerning this event. The event ascertained the correct view we have been
repeating since the NDALC meeting in January 1996 that the political
consequences of any military operation pursued at home must be evaluated, and
that full coordination between NDA at home and abroad must be maintained in
such actions.

(3) Concerning the Comprehensive Political Solution:
Attached is a position paper including our party's vision on the democratic
peaceful solution with respect to the principles of a comprehensive political
solution and the negotiating status of the NDA.

A REALISTIC PROGRAM OF ACTION FOR THE NDA IN THE NEXT PERIOD

We propose the Kampala meeting approves of a definitive and realistic plan of
action for the upcoming period. We believe the plan has to include the
following issues:

(1) Coordination with the NDA Leadership at Home on the escalation of political
action towards the Uprising and increasing the struggle for restoration of
democracy on the basis of the NDALC requirement of preparing the conducive
atmosphere for the political solution. We have to initiate a broad
international campaign on this concern to increase material support to cater
for NDA activities at home and abroad.

(2) Execution of the June resolutions on armed work and the provision of all
necessary means to increase it.

(*) We suggest that the meeting discusses the executive performance of the NDA
in accordance with the Asmara Resolutions of June 1999 including:

(1) Assessment of the program and performance of all the bodies that had been
formed to implement the program within 3 months up to October 21, 1999. In this
regard, we noticed the complete absence of these bodies including the task
force of the committee of five and chairpersons of the specialized committees.

A clear decision must be issued on this matter: Do we proceed with the same
structure if an agreement is reached on ways to activate it? Do we return to
the former executive office, or do we find a new form?

In general, the core of the problem is not pertinent to a specific form. The
problem is correlated with the political will of the NDA partners and the
extent to which they believe in the institutional role of the NDA. With that,
it is a must to issue a clear decision on the NDA conference.

(2) In line with our commitment to organized and institutional work within
unity of the NDA, we need to evaluate performance of the committee of five
during this preceding period of time. On our part, we forward the following
observations:

(*) Before the Cairo meeting, the news came that the joint Egyptian-Libyan
committee held a meeting with what was referred to as the committee of five in
which there was agreement to assign September 13, 1999, as a day for meeting of
the preparatory committee, despite the fact that only 2 members of the
committee of five were available in Cairo at that date and NDALC never allowed
a member to act for absent members of the committee.

Moreover, evaluation of government's response and results of the efforts
exerted by the joint Egyptian-Libyan committee, in addition to decision-making
of the NDALC's next step, are all NDALC core agenda according to the NDA
Resolutions of Asmara, Cairo, and Tripoli. These are not designated tasks for
the committee of five to take under any circumstances.

(*) The committee of five announced statements on issues that lied beyond its
jurisdiction. For example, the committee of five announced after a meeting on
November 9, 1999, that it has accepted in principle the American invitation to
the NDA. This certainly is jurisdiction of the NDALC alone.

(*) We noticed that a number of meetings by the committee of five were attended
by representatives who were not nominated by NDALC. This occurred in the
absence of the designated members of the committee. This situation needs
revision and correction.

November 11, 1999
CPS

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