PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL SOLUTION AND NDA NEGOTIATIONS:

Introduction:

We ascertain our opinion that a comprehensive political solution [for the
crisis of Sudan] must be rightfully placed as a part of the NDA line of
strategy with respect to priorities of the opposition's tactics so that the
solution comes about as a result of concerted attacks to reinforce the Uprising
at home and the armed struggle abroad.

(*) We are equally confident that the regime aims by its current enthusiasm
towards peace initiatives and the former calls for direct and indirect dialogue
to gain time to curb the increasing resistance of its existence and the
increasing haunt to prosecute it for the horrible crimes it committed.

The regime aims to beautify its image before the regional and international
public, to break the tight isolation its wrongful policies and adventures
brought upon it. The regime also hopes to break apart the NDA unity and it
hopes NDA partners respond to it favorably.

(*) On our part, we approve of the political solution as an option that
involves all elements and tactics of struggle on equal terms with options of
the Uprising and armed struggle, that the broadest political and popular forces
might participate in it and engage in battles that lead tactically or
strategically to the achievement of temporary or far-reaching goals, according
to certain conditions.

All this requires full clarity and decisiveness in the process of specifying
the aims. The NDA has announced several times that it accepts the political
option not to return to the pre-June state of affairs, replace an
administration with another, reconcile with the regime, or "make-up and
reform."

The NDA accepts the political solution with the aim of dismantling the NIF
coup-regime, liquidate it, and reinstate democratic rule to open the path for
challenging the sources of our national crisis, which is deeply rooted since
independence times, in order to construct the flourishing, new, and united
Sudan we are yearning to have.

Without all this, the political solution will only stand as a bargain that
betrays the sacrifices of our people. The fate of such solution will be a
failure that can only be thrown into the garbage of history.

(*) The political solution with this conceptualization is not less serious or
vibrant than options of the Uprising and armed struggle. The acceptance of NIF
state rulers, even under any assumption that they might be fully committed to
the making of a political solution by negotiations, does not mean that they are
about to abandon their project that carried them to organize the coup and
destroy democracy with no remorse to stop the crimes they have been committing.

They will not abandon exiling the others who do not subscribe to their rule.
They will not abandon the religious, ethnic, and cultural arrogance they are
performing. They will not cease brutalizing their opponents, eradicating them,
and humiliating them. They will continue to rub the wealth of the homeland for
their own benefit.

Because NIF rulers are shaken by the moving earthquake under their feet,
however, they wish to pursue the realization of their plans with other tactics.
They dream of restoring old alliances. Hence, the political solution resembles
new means for both of us: The NDA and the regime. Our goals and theirs,
however, remain as they were. The struggle for the goals remains as it was with
all its youth and fierceness.

In this struggle, the regime uses all of the means under its disposal: The
power of the authority and its international relations; the sources and wealth
of the homeland, state repression through the use of disciplinary forces,
parallel forces, security forces, and spies; and the internal and external
media.

Our material abilities are much less and yet original and honest. With us is an
unconquerable power, that of our great people. All we have to do is to use
these abilities in the best manner possible.

(*) The acceptance of the political option does not mean a stoppage of the
other options. We reject the regime's dishonest call to cease fire and stop the
"aggressive" campaigns. The regime's lies were uncovered by the attack of its
southern battalion on the NDA forces in the Eastern Front and the unpolished
insults of Bashir to the NDA leadership.

Since the regime has not ceased building up its military and political power
and media campaign, we have to provide all support for our masses at home in
preparation of the popular Uprising. We have to execute the NDALC resolutions
of June 1999 on armed struggle and pursue our political, diplomatic, and media
campaigns to publicize crimes of the regime and its maneuvers. Such is the
necessity for an NDA unity that is based on a united political letter of the
NDA and the movement of its partners, full clarity in the tasks of our struggle
at this time, and close coordination between all forces of our people at home
and abroad.

(*) The demand for a serious political solution must be addressed to the
regime, not the NDA. Our firm position in the NDA is shown as follows:

The NDALC announced acceptance, in principle, of the political solution. The
NDLAC specified the aims targeted by the political solution (liquidation of the
coup, prosecution of the coup leaders, restoration of democracy, and
reconstructing the Sudanese state on the basis of Asmara Resolutions 1995).

The NDALC designated the NDA references (primarily the Fundamental Issues
Conference). It required the regime to prepare a conducive atmosphere for
a fruitful dialogue in accordance with public definitive measures on whose
legitimacy and rationality the national and international public has already
agreed.

Most recently, the NDALC announced that it will be responsible of dealing with
the issues of the political solution and reaching decisions, and it has formed
supportive bodies for this purpose.

On the opposite side, the regime has not yet announced the objectives it is
pursuing or the references it is taking. Up to now in the light of the open
conflict within the regime's leadership, we do not know who is taking
responsibility of negotiations with the NDA and who will take the decision.

The regime has not taken any serious step until this moment to create a
conducive atmosphere to dialogue. All these facts indicate the regime is not
serious and that, furthermore, the regime has some hidden agenda that may be
aimed to use the political solution as a masquerade to gain time until it may
find a way out of the crisis.

(*) Once again, we welcome with the other partners in the NDA all regional and
international initiatives that seriously aim to make peace, stability, and
democracy in The Sudan. It is necessary, however, to explain to the regional
and international parties that the solutions laid and pressed by the regional
and international communities will continue to be partial and fragile
regardless of their good faith unless these initiatives open the path to
eradicate the tyrannous rule and restore a state based on citizenship without
any discrimination by ethnicity or religion.

The evidence is clear in the experiences of Somalia, Congo, the Lakes, Liberia
and the other conflicting areas in the continent. We cannot deny or ignore the
effective role the regional and international communities played to support
peace, democracy, and stability of The Sudan. But this role will not be
effective unless it addresses itself directly to the essence of the crisis and
the roots of the crisis. In this context, we renew our confidence in the IGAD
Initiative and the role of the IGAD partners. We renew our confidence in the
Egyptian-Libyan Joint Initiative.

We recall our earlier speech about what we perceived as shortcomings in both
initiatives. We pointed out the fact that the IGAD Initiative will continue to
be incomplete unless it views the problem of civil war in Southern Sudan within
the framework of Sudan's crisis, unless it solves as well the crisis resulting
from the National Islamic Front's control of the country. We also indicated
that the Egyptian-Libyan Joint Initiative is short of a proclamation on
principles of the comprehensive political solution.

Coordination or amalgamation of the two initiatives is not an NDA task. It is
responsibility of the initiating partners. The NDALC resolutions of June 1999
indicated the NDA looks forward for a form to approach all these sisterly
initiatives together to find a suitable form through consultation between the
initiating partners.

The NDA assists in this process by preparing a nonpartisan definitive position
for negotiation with no tendency to satisfy any friend at the expense of the
principled stand that is based on the NDA vision to Proclamation of the
Comprehensive Political Solution according to the Fundamental Issues Conference
(1995), and a strict commitment to the requirement of preparing a conducive
atmosphere before any dialogue is entered into with the regime, whether within
the IGAD Initiative or the Egyptian-Libyan Joint Initiative.

The Conducive Atmosphere
The practical stances of the NDA towards the political solution, as expressed
by the Fundamental Issues Resolutions, NDALC resolutions, and NDA memorandums
at home, came as fruition of the collective effort and will power of all NDA
partners and popular opposition, including national personalities.

These stands transformed into a forcible will that is able to pull victory
through the collective will and struggle of our masses and the leadership of
our people at home and abroad.

The requirement for preparing a conducive atmosphere for dialogue is a
legitimate claim because it is the right of our people at home, with their
masses and leadership alike, to fully participate in actual reality in any
dialogue concerning their future and destiny and to follow up with open eyes
and ears any negotiation of the sort.

The NDA requirement for preparation of a conducive atmosphere before
deliberating any negotiations is not different from the requirement of insuring
the freedom of assembly, organization, expression, and movement for our people
to exercise their right in the ongoing dialogue on their future.

The experiences of people who were motivated by crises to pursue political
settlement ascertain the fact that the settlement starts off with a basic
change in the structures of authority and its constitution and laws to
guarantee full democratic freedoms without any restrictions on political
parties, trades unions, popular organizations, and the press so that the people
say their opinions and every party offers its own solutions.

All those who committed crimes against people and the homeland will be excluded
from authority. The hearings of unjust tribunals will be published, and the
independence of judiciary and the rule of law will be restored.

The requirement for a conducive atmosphere is also a struggle demand that is
well-fitted as a slogan, forum, and tool to broaden and organize the movement
of masses at home in the form of specified demands for the authority through
the memorandums, signatures, and marches, etc., of NDA bodies, trades unions,
students' movement, and others.

This way, we demonstrate the objective of our demand for the conducive
atmosphere. We avoid hiding our demand or seeking to smuggle it. This applies
to all of our methods regarding the political solution.

(*) By adhering to the requirement of the conducive atmosphere we wish, besides
the guarantees needed for our people to verbalize opinions and participate in
the formation of their future, to discover the extent to which the regime is
serious. The democratic freedoms we are struggling for are only a small part of
the rights and freedoms that negotiations are supposed to obtain, if
successfully made. They inform on whether the regime is serious or not.

The regime must therefore prove that it has a serious intention by accepting
the political option through the application of these measures for the
conducive atmosphere:

(1) The regime must announce its agenda, position, and the targets it wants to
achieve by negotiation.
(2) Freeze the 1998 constitution.
(3) Freeze all laws and constitutional decrees that restrict freedoms such as
the state security law; enforce a practical - not verbal - cancellation of the
state of emergency; allow public activity for all parties and organizations,
freedom of unions, propagation of democracy, and freedom of opinion; release
political detainees; drop all sentences issued against political prisoners;
stop any arrest, summon, or haunting of politicians; guarantee the freedom of
movement, expression, and organization; and cancel the law banning the free
movement of citizens.
(4) Cancellation of the "Tawali" Political Law and Unions Law 1992, and
abrogation of all laws banning party and union freedoms.
(5) Cancellation of all powers of political security, abandoning ghost houses
and prosecuting those responsible of them.
(6) Cancellation of police and courts of the Public Order.
(7) Return all confiscated properties.

(*) To prevent deception or any attempt of deference, agreement must be reached
to allocate a deadline (3 months) for government to respond to the terms of
conducive atmosphere.