The
Central Committee
Subject:
The peaceful democratic solution
A
paper presented to the NDA
Leadership Council Asmara, Eritrea June 1999
Dear
brothers, Chairman and members of the Leadership Council of The National
Democratic Alliance (NDA)
This
meeting is being held in a highly-charged political atmosphere. There are many
hot issues which point, directly or indirectly, to a number of possibilities in
relation to the future of the Sudan. In the forefront of these issues are the
discussions about negotiations and reconciliation which have dominated the
Sudanese political arena at both opposition and government levels. In
particular, this meeting is going to discuss a specific proposal from Mr Sadik
El-Mahdi.
This
is not the first time the call for reconciliation has been heard. However, the
experience of the past yeas has proved what we have always asserted, namely,
that the regime uses the offer of reconciliation simply as a maneuver to gain
time, to escape from the increasing pressure of the popular movement that is
tightening the noose around its neck, and to create divisions among the
opposition and weaken our resistance. Of course, no reasonable person would
reject a genuine peaceful settlement for the crisis that has engulfed our
country, and choose instead, the prolongation of the bloodshed. We, the members
of the NDA, are prepared to consider the option of a peaceful settlement, as
long as it can realistically lead to the liquidation of the NIF coup and the
restoration of democracy, and pave the way for addressing the root causes of
this chronic crisis. By the same token, the NDA has reiterated its positive
position towards all the regional and international initiatives that endeavor to
help our country overcome its crisis.
The
dispute that have emerged between the various factions of the NDA regarding a
peaceful solution are not disputes over the preference for - or even the
legitimacy of - a peaceful solution as such, as some have tried to portray them.
The crux of the matter is the content of such a solution. Therefore, the issue
is not confined to the nature of the instrument of change, i.e. whether through
a peaceful or an armed uprising, negotiated or reconciliatory solution. Rather,
it boils down to the nature of the change itself and its final outcome, whether
it will address the crisis and resolve it in a manner that goes far beyond its
mere political manifestation. We have to bear in mind that the net result of the
change must necessarily be intertwined, to a lesser or a greater degree, with
the nature of the instrument used to bring it about. Thus, before we embark on
any deliberation as to the instruments to be adopted in liquidating the
dictatorship of the NIF, we should stop to consider an important and central
question. What is the objective and aim of the continued struggle since the 30th
of June 1989? Should not the question that was raised by the Sudanese people in
the aftermath of the coup necessarily and continuously be at the forefront of
our thinking, "what is the alternative?" Shall we rise up now, only to
see the crisis return again at some later time?
It
is clear that this question requires an answer that is neither enigmatic nor
ambiguous. For it embodies within itself a decisive plea which expresses the
desire of the Sudanese masses not only to get rid of the oppression of the NIF
dictatorship, but also of the crisis that has engulfed the Sudan since the dawn
of the independence. The people have engaged in an indescribable struggle, they
have made many great sacrifices. The response of the Sudanese political
movement, as represented by its parties, trade unions and armed forces, was the
formation of the NDA and the formulation of its charter, program and various
declarations. The Sudanese masses have welcomed this response. They have
embraced it and they have continued their struggle under its banner and
leadership. It is on the basis of this reality, that we in the Communist Party
have always upheld and defended the NDA.
-
Following the Geneva meeting between Mr Sadek and Dr Al-Turabi, a crises broke
out within the NDA. The subsequent disputes that have arisen, are objective
ones, which ought to have been - and still have to be - resolved in a clear and
transparent manner, and not through condemnations in the media.
-
We issued a statement that was widely distributed both inside and outside Sudan
affirming that the meeting between Sayed Sadek and Dr Al-Turabi was an
individual initiative of the Umma Party, which fell within the scope of its
rights to an independent action. Accordingly, it should not be attributed to the
NDA. As a matter of fact, the NDA's charter and programs of action do not
prohibit the independent positions and tactics of its members, both within and
outside the NDA, nor do they prevent there being strife among them. But our
consistent stance in the Communist Party has been that we should begin from
those positions which unite us with the opposition in the NDA, and its charter,
which we back and defend. We do not accept that our tactics should develop in
parallel, contradict or replace what was agreed upon within the NDA.
-
Irrespective of the outcome of Geneva meeting and the degree to which it concurs
with or relates to or differs from the charter, resolutions and memoranda of the
NDA, the manner and form in which it took place has left the NDA with two
options, either to accept this outcome or reject it. This is bound to deal a
blow to the basic principles of the alliance and the tradition and practices
pursued by the NDA. The upholding of these principles has in the past made it
possible for the NDA to overcome any problem or crises that threatened to stand
in its way. When we talk of these principles, we are thinking specifically of
the great significance attached to the principle of consultation. In the contest
of our concern for the unity and cohesion of the NDA, our party, as mentioned
previously, has made the following proposal:
-
This matter should be presented with all its details to the organs of the NDA
both inside and outside the Sudan for a frank discussion, in order to determine
the rules and mechanisms which will govern the manner in which we proceed before
proceeding into any further discussion on the outcome of the Geneva meeting. We
have also indicated that when our party receives the proceedings and conclusions
of the meeting, it will state its views on the matter. In view of the foregoing,
we have refrained from expressing any views on what took place in Geneva,
preferring to wait till we receive detailed disclosure of the meeting's
business.
-
The call for a peaceful and democratic solution, as expressed in the Asmara
declaration and the memoranda of the NDA inside the Sudan, is the fruit of the
collective efforts and will of all the elements of the NDA, the opposition, and
the national figures. Without this collective action, no such call can hope to
be effective or to be transformed into
a powerful and effective political capability.
-
It is relevant to note that while
not every thing in the NDA is virtuous and positive, nor is the NDA simply
reducible to a collection of negative factors and defects. We note that its
formulation, charter and working methodology contain certain checks and balances
which can correct defects as they arise and pave the way for an effective
revitalization. Through collective effort, it is possible to overcome a number
of hurdles and complications which would face any broad alliance on the scale of
the NDA, which is the broadest political front known in the modern history of
Sudan.
We still maintain the position that the nature of the regime makes it
doubtful that it is possible to engage in successful dialogue with it. Its claim
to recognize other political forces and accept real political pluralism does not
deserve to be taken seriously. Furthermore, the regime only seeks to employ
others in its institutions on the basis of its established principles, refuse to
abandon the principle of the theocratic state and seeks to escape from any form
of accountability.
It is true that there are signs of strife within the regime, which will
certainly continue. However, the most important thing to bear in mind is that
the ruling authority is totally united in the attempt to ensure its survival.
But, while we see Turabi and Al-Bashir as two sides of the same coin, we do not
wish to reject the possibility of exploiting the contradictions and conflicts
that may exist between them. Internal and external circumstances may force the
regime to retreat here and there, but it still remains wedded to its basic
principles and conditions, and a peaceful solution to the crisis is not part of
its present strategy. The regime is only seeking to buy time while working to
encourage the disintegration of the opposition. As regards the NDA outside
Sudan, we hold the following opinion. The proper stance regarding the option of
a peaceful solution is to uphold the NDA's resolutions on the issue,
while at the same time maintaining the political offensive and escalating
military operations, as well as supporting a popular uprising that could force
the regime to surrender.
- In general, we welcome any peaceful solution to the calamity facing the
Sudan. However, we distinguish between a peaceful solution and reconciliation,
because any reconciliation with the present regime which does not entail holding
the regime accountable, would mean absolving it of the most serious crimes
committed against the Sudanese people in their modern history. It also means
accepting the conditions for reproducing the crisis in the Sudan. Moreover, we
reject any peaceful project that would take us back to the status quo that
prevailed before the 30th of June 1989, or that perpetuates what has happened
since that date. For us, the essential point of reference is the resolutions of
Asmara Fundamental Issues Conference.
- In June 1994, our party agreed with other members of the NDA on the
Declaration of Principles issued by the foreign ministers of IGAD on the 20th
May 1994, which asserted the following:
1-
The rejection of military solution. 2- The need to agree on a just and peaceful
political solution. 3- Assigning
priority to the unity of Sudan within the recognition of political and social
pluralism and the guarantee of equality of citizens. 4- Separating religion from
state by establishing a democratic secular state in the Sudan. 5- Ensuring
public liberties and guaranteeing human rights in accordance with international
conventions on the basis of the rule of law and the independence of the
judiciary and the just distribution of wealth and power. 6- Affirming people's
right to self-determination on the basis of a referendum, should the commitment
to these principles and their defined basis fail.
While confirming its acceptance of these principles, our party has
clarified that the goals they embody will not be realized if the problem of the
South within the framework of the Sudan is not taken into full account, and the
crisis resulting from the control of the NIF over the country properly
addressed. It is true that the regime has retreated from its original position
of rejecting the principles of IGAD, and now says it accepts them. Yet, this
acceptance remains largely theoretical, given the context of political
maneuvering, and the fact that the regime has not really made any serious step
towards executing any item of the declaration.
- The question of national reconciliation or national consensus in the
political codes of the people will have to be seriously addressed, once
conditions are appropriate for the final liquidation of the established forms of
power that produced the present crisis. In their place, new forms will be
established, legitimized by a democratic constitution. This constitution should
protect the rights of all and avert those catastrophes that arise from bloody
conflict and civil war.
The experience of those people who have been impelled by crisis
circumstances to follow the paths of reconciliation, confirm that reconciliation
must begin with following steps: there should be a basic change in the organs of
the present authority, its constitution and laws, so that full democratic
liberties are provided without any restrictions on political parties, trade
unions, civil organizations and newspapers. This is necessary if the public are
to speak their mind freely and if every party is to present its views on the
solutions needed. It is also a necessary prerequisite for removing from
positions of public responsibility all those who have committed crimes against
the people and the nation, for restoring the independence of the judiciary and
the rule of the law, and for making public all the details of past unjust
trials.
- Any serious project for a peaceful solution should not compromise on
principles, but rather should result in an acknowledgement that there is a
crisis and an agreement on the basis for its radical solution. However, if this
process is to avoid being hijacked by the regime and turned into a maneuver to
resolve its own dilemma by giving it time to get its breath back and produce
what looks like a compromise between two parties to the conflict, but is in fact
merely a change from one administration to another, and hence the repetition of
those past experiences which embody the seeds of future crises, any peaceful
solution must necessarily meet the following two conditions:
A- It should stop the civil war and establish the basis for a just and
comprehensive peace through a clear agreement, covered by all necessary
guarantees, arrangements and methodologies, to end the Sudanese crisis which has
persisted since independence and thus pave the way to the creation of a new
united democratic and stable Sudan.
B- It should strip the NIF of all its illegal gains which it acquired as
a result of the 30th of June coup and through the actions of its bloody regime,
punish all those who committed crimes against the country and its people, and
return all funds plundered from private and public sources.
On the basis of the aforementioned, we propose that the position of the
NDA with regard to the issue of political dialogue should be as follows:
1) The memo of the 29th of December 1998 was a call from the NDA to
choose the option of a peaceful settlement of the Sudanese question. Yet, the
reference for the NDA for the management of the process of negotiations, remains
its charter, the resolutions of the Asmara Conference and the resolutions of the
leadership council of June 1995.
2) The government refused to receive the memo in question and closed the
doors in the face of the NDA delegates. Therefore, before starting any
negotiations, the government must officially receive this memo and declare its
recognition of the NDA and all its factions. Among the conditions for any
negotiations, should be the condition that they are conducted between equal
partners. As a matter of fact, any dialogue prior to the acceptance of such a
condition can only be futile. How is it possible for two bodies to negotiate,
when one of them in a ruling regime which does not recognize the opposition, and
does not hesitate to commit the worst atrocities against them?
3) A healthy and conducive environment must be prepared for the
negotiations. In order to realize this, the regime must take a number of steps,
including the following:
- Admit its responsibility for toppling the legitimate government through
its coup of the 30th of June 1989 and its confiscation of democracy and public
liberties.
- Abrogate the Tewali law and permit the public activities of political
parties, organizations, trade unions and the propagation of democracy and the
freedom of thought.
- Recognize political and party plurality as well as the NDA, as a
condition for dialogue between equal entities.
- Release all political detainees with an irrevocable undertaking not to
detain any person on the ground he or she holds opposing views.
- Annul the present constitution and remove all laws which place
restrictions on liberties.
- Dissolve all the organs of oppression and security.
- Declare its readiness to be held judicially accountable with respect to
complaints of violation of human rights, plundering of public funds and the
abuse of power.
4- It must be emphasized that to give any definitive opinion on the
matter of the national conference, to identify the working party for the
management of the dialogue, would be premature as long as the aforementioned
stipulations remain unfulfilled.
5- On the other hand, if the regime makes the necessary arrangements to
fulfil all the stipulations specified above, as quid pro quo the NDA for its
part will undertake to cease military operations and not to resort to the use of
force.
6- It is also necessary to note that the success of any political
agreement will be conditional on its inclusion of two complementary components:
*
Firstly, a constituent component, that is to be carefully agreed upon in all its
details so as to avoid any possible loop holes. This will then become a
constitutional undertaking, which will govern the realization of the peaceful
solution, and should proceed as follows:
-
Issue an irrevocable constitutional declaration replacing the present
constitution, the Tewali law and all the legislation restricting liberties. The
declaration must guarantee the rights, liberties and principles of pleural
democracy. It should also include the special proclamations embodied in
the Nairobi Declaration, that is, decentralization and the right of self-
determination.
-
Conclude of a just and comprehensive peace agreement to end the civil war, based
on the principles of equal citizenship, the equitable distribution of wealth and
decentralization.
-
Restructure the organs of the state on a national basis and agree on their
regulation and management.
-
Agree on the constitutional conference, its composition and the duration for
completing its tasks.
-
Return private and public funds and pay compensations for all crimes committed.
*
The second component concerns the responsibility of the transitional government.
This involves the execution of those practical tasks resulting from the
realization of the first component, including the organization for convening the
constitutional conference. It also involves the undertaking of the usual tasks
of the government, such as the provision of law and order, social services,
formulation of the budget, restoration of foreign relations, enacting the
elections law and the law organizing the referendum and take the necessary
measures for their realization.
-
No secrecy or negotiations behind doors. Every thing must be disclosed in detail
to the public and the negotiations must be completely transparent.
-The
negotiations must be in accordance with regional and international guarantees.
-
The negotiating team must represent all the elements of the NDA, and the
leadership council should monitor the progress of the negotiations and approve
their final result.
-
Once again, we reiterate our call to unite our will to dismantle the NIF regime,
instead of dismantling the NDA, and to unite all our ranks, so that our country
can sail safely out of the impasse. We hope this meeting of ours will move
decisively towards the achievement of the sacred objective.
Representative
of the Communist Party
to
the NDA Leadership Council