CPS (May 1999)
STRATEGIC ISSUES
The political climates are rampant with issues whose debate suggests
probabilities directly related to the future of Sudan. These are issues that
require clarity in principle at this critical stage of opposition development.
Therefore, we released this paper to explain our strategic position regarding a
number of these issues. We prepared this paper with an openness that accepts
discussion and revision of any of its points in a direction that aims to unite
the broadest front possible of national and democratic forces to defend the
interests and aspirations of the People of The Sudan.
In these most recent times, the Sudanese political arena, including both
authority and opposition, was filled with talks about dialogue, consensus, and
reconciliation. Some parties portrayed the situation as if there is a dispute
on the benefits, preferences, or even legitimacy of peaceful solutions. The
real issue, as every one knows, is the context of these solutions.
The issue is not simply confined to the quality and means of making change with
either a peaceful uprising or an armed one, with negotiation or a consensual
method. Because the result of change is correlated with necessity and the sort
of modalities in use, the issue is founded on the essence of change, its
ensuing result, and the extent to which it would face out the crisis and
resolve it deeper than any political surface may possibly allow.
Notwithstanding, before any talk is made on the means to eradicate the Islamic
Front's dictatorship or modalities of overthrowing the regime as mentioned in
the NDA literature, we ought to ask a fundamental question: "What is the
aim
and goal-achievement of the continuous struggle since the 30th of June, 1989,
up to the present time? Is the maximum point of achievement we are aspiring to
accomplish a replacement of a new authority instead of the existing fascism?
Shouldn't the question spontaneously laid by Sudanese Masses the first morning
of the coup, "What is the alternative? Do we uprise so that the crisis
repeats
itself?" continuously stand in the forefront of our thinking?
It is clear that this question was not searching for an answer undiscovered yet
or lost. The question carried with it a sufficient answer expressing the
Sudanese Masses' will to eradicate Islamic Front's dictatorship and the whole
crisis that is deeply rooted beyond the dawn of our national independence. The
Masses did not take the question from a negative perspective. The Masses lined
up in a heroic struggle in which they gave unprecedented sacrifices. The
response to the Masses by the Sudanese movement of political parties, unions,
and the Armed Forces was to establish a National Democratic Alliance and to
formulate its programs, resolutions, and proclamations. The Masses welcomed
this response. They embraced it and they struggled under the flags and
leadership of the NDA. We, in the CPS, adhered to the NDA form. We defend it
on the basis of this reality and a totality of objective factors of which the
following are foremost:-
(+) The NDA form and strategy are an outcome of an objective analysis of the
crisis which developed and consolidated itself in four links: the unity of
Sudan, peace, democracy, and development. Consequently, the NDA is not an
opposition front merely to solve the problem of political authority. The NDA is
a pool in which a peaceful democratic debate has been undertaken to solve all
problems of the Homeland, according to a new methodology to put right the
negative aspects of the past and prevent a reproduction of the crisis. A
confrontation to a cause so deeply rooted as such should incite the interest of
all People. The NDA form is a very effective contribution around which the
Masses rallied and placed their hopes, not only to overthrow the NIF rule but
to overcome 40 years of frustration, or even more, to achieve their aspirations
for a nation that exercises with democracy and political freedom a flourishing
material and spiritual life.
(+) The NDA form sprang from the contradictions that accompanied Sudanese
political performance since independence and have articulated in the well-known
vicious circle (the sequence of military coup and popular uprisings). The 3
sides of the triangle (parties, unions, and disciplinary forces) were hence
established. These forces united on a program to which they committed
themselves, according to a careful critique of the past, envisaging political,
economic, social, and constitutional reforms for the country. The reforms hinge
on the establishment of a democratic Sudan to recognize its political, ethnic,
religious, and cultural pluralism, and to observe the rights and dignity of
humans with guarantees of equality to all People, even development to regions,
and just participation in wealth and authority.
Perhaps it is now a priority that the reconstruction of a modern, united, and
stable Sudanese state is not possible without the collective efforts of all
political forces
irrespective of their size or influence, as well the efforts of production
masses and the military, all of
whom are included in the NDA form.
(+) The NDA experiences affirmed, especially after the Fundamental Issues
Conference, that NDA is a viable approach to stop civil war and to make peace
in our country. Indeed, the NDA Charter and Resolutions united different or
contradictory forces that continued for a long time, for political, social,
historical, and regional reasons, etc., to engage in conflicts before they
finally agreed that the Homeland is faltering apart and a massive danger is
taking them in toto. The right thinking is to emphasize the interests that tie
them up as a minimum requisite of life more than contradictions did. The time
has come to meet with sincerity and faithfulness to make of Sudan a new
reality.
(+) The NDA Charter is not sacred. The consensus on Charter does not mean that
it is untouchable. It is important to realize that Charter can be developed and
renewed. Nonetheless, recognition is needed that any promotion of the NDA
Charter must not abrogate or contradict NDA fixations, if the crisis of Sudan
is to be resolved not escalated. Moreover, these fixations are not nullified by
the next transitional period. They will continue to influence the future of
Sudan to preserve the united democratic state and to prepare, for good, a
conducive atmosphere for the peaceful rotation of authority and the achievement
of a development project for the benefits of our Masses.
In the same token, NDA Charter is not a monopoly of parties and leaders,
whether in or outside the NDA. The Charter develops and is promoted the more it
is subjected to a wide discussion by all sectors, the more contributions are
provided by qualified specialists, regardless of their political affiliations.
The more Charter is widely and deeply scrutinized by the Masses, the more
Masses will protect the NDA from all withdrawals or attacks.
(+) The NDA Charter and Program of Action are not a substitute for the
independent stands or tactics of our Party in or outside the NDA. They do not
cancel out Party conflicts with NDA other partners. The solid position of our
party, however, starts from where we have united ourselves with the Opposition
and the NDA. We support the NDA, defend the NDA, and we do not make of our
tactics parallel, contradictory, or a replacement to NDA agreements.
(+) We are opposed to an NDA that is monopolized by a group of political
forces. We believe the NDA must be kept opened to accommodate all opposition
forces according to NDA fixations. It is essential to admit the NDA is not all
good and positive. Nor is NDA viewed as only negative and deficient. We must
equally admit that the NDA forum, Charter, and methods of work have the
potential to correct all mistakes and to renew the path. Practicing the common
tasks, the NDA will overcome many obstacles or complexities that naturally
affect any broad alliance such as the NDA, the biggest political front ever
known in the modern history of The Sudan.
(+) The NDA tasks Abroad are:-
1/ To make a broad dialogue between all partners on ways to develop the Charter
and Resolutions.
2/ To reinforce the Uprising at home.
3/ Military activity as a modality to overthrow the regime.
4/ Political and diplomatic activities with countries of the Region and the
International arena.
5/ Media activities for home and abroad.
WAYS TO ERADICATE THE DICTATORSHIP
We have introduced this paper with reference to talks on dialogue and
consensus. We will now specify our position concerning this issue, the
democratic peaceful solution as we prefer to call it, while still emphasizing
our strategic preference for eradicating the dictatorship through a Protected
Uprising.
The Democratic Peaceful Solution:
This is not the first time that the voice of authority calls loudly
for a
consensus, whether by direct leadership or through initiators supported by the
authority. We have continuously affirmed that the regime with direct or
indirect initiatives is maneuvering with the aim of gaining time to curb
attacks of the Masses Movement, and to divide the unity of Opposition to be
able to defeat it. Certainly, not a single person would soundly reject a
democratic peaceful solution if it possibly leads to eradication of the NIF
coup, restoration of democracy and basic freedoms, and working to uproot the
crisis. In the same direction, we reiterate our positive standpoint towards all
regional and international initiatives that endeavor to assist our country in
resolving the conflict. Our position with regard to the democratic peaceful
solution is detailed as follows:-
First, An Introductory Assessment:
(*) The nature of the regime makes of any peaceful dialogue with the
regime a
skepticism.
The regime is not serious enough to recognize the existence of others for a
true democratic pluralism. It only sees the merging of others in its
institutions in submission to its own rules.
The regime is not prepared to dispense with the religious state. It elusively
works to escape prosecution.
(*) The call for a democratic peaceful solution, as in the Asmara Resolutions
and the NDA Memorandum at home, was an outcome of the collective effort and
will power of all NDA Partners, Opposition, and national personalities. This
call will not effectively transcend itself into an efficient political force
without collective action.
(*) In general, we welcome any attempt that tries to find a democratic peaceful
solution for the crisis of Sudan. At the same time, we differentiate between a
peaceful solution and reconciliation. Reconciliation with the regime
(conceptualized in terms of God's forgiveness of the past) means a negligence
of the worst crimes ever committed against the People and Sudan in its modern
history. It means a reproduction of the crisis of The Sudan. We reject any
peaceful project that takes us back to the situation before June 30th or that
is devoted to the aftermath of June 30th.
The starting point for us is the Resolutions of the Fundamental Issues
Conference. In June 1994, the Party agreed with NDA other Partners on the
Declaration of Principles as issued on May 20th, 1994 by the IGAAD Ministers of
Foreign Affairs. The Declaration emphasized the rejection of military action
and the need to agree on a democratic peaceful solution, to give first priority
to the unity of Sudan within the political and social diversity of the country,
to guarantee equality of all citizens, separate religion from State, insure
public freedoms and human rights guarantees in accordance with international
norms, the rule of law, independence of the judiciary, and just distribution of
wealth and authority.
The Declaration ascertained the right of citizens to self-determination by
plebiscite in case of failure of obligation to these principles and specified
rules. With the assurance made on accepting these principles, our Party
explained they would be incomplete unless problem of the South is seen in the
framework of Sudan crisis as a whole and that the crisis generated by the
Islamic Front's control of the country have to be resolved. On the other side,
despite the fact that the regime withdrew its former refusal to the IGAAD
Principles and accepted them, still it continued to be a nominal acceptance for
maneuvering as the regime never made a single step to realize the IGAAD
Declaration in actual fact.
(*) The conflict inside the authority is increasing. But the authority is fully
united to defend its existence. For us, al-Turabi and Bashir are faces of the
same coin. The internal and external conditions may compel the authority to
retreat from time to time. And yet, the authority is determined to maintain its
fixations and terms of rule. Peaceful solutions are not part of their strategy.
Their only aim is to gain time while working to disintegrate the Opposition.
For the NDA Abroad, we think that the righteous way concerning the option of
peaceful solution is to adhere to the NDA Resolutions on peaceful initiatives
at the same time NDA must continue to launch political attacks and to increase
military operations for the regime to surrender.
Secondly, Negotiations in Our Opinion
National Reconciliation, or National Consensus, in political norms of
peoples
represents a transitional period to eradicate the existing forms of government
that produced the crisis, to establish new forms according to a democratic
constitution that guarantees the rights of all citizens and protects the
country from armed conflicts and civil war. The experiences of nations
motivated by crisis to find national reconciliation solutions ascertain that a
reconciliation starts with a radical change of the existing structure,
constitution, and laws of the ruling authority to provide for the exercise of
full democratic freedoms without any restrictions on political parties, unions,
or mass organizations and the press.
The People will thus participate in the political life and every party or group
will contribute with solutions. All those who committed crimes against People
and the Homeland will be excluded from positions of government. The proceedings
and whereabouts of extrajudicial trials will be published and independence of
the judiciary and rule of the law will be restored.
Any serious endeavor for a peaceful solution must not be a bargain of
principles. The crisis must be acknowledged and an agreement must be reached on
the agenda by a radical treatment. To prevent the target from becoming a
maneuver to salvage NIF rule to breath again, a bilateral bargain between two
partners of the conflict, or a simple replacement of administration with
another as a replication of experiences to reproduce the crisis, these two
premises must be available for a peaceful solution:-
(A) A complete stoppage of civil war and the establishment of a just and
comprehensive peace via a clear agreement with guarantees and systems to put an
end to the Sudanese crisis which is rooted in independence times. This will
open the road for the setting up of a united democratic and stable Sudan.
(B) To dispossess the Islamic Front from all illegal gains it collected by the
coup of June 1989 and the killer regime it made, and the punishment of whoever
committed an offense against Sudan or citizens of The Sudan to restore all
monies and property stolen from the Public Treasury or individuals.
Based on these premises, we suggest that the NDA position regarding political
dialogue with the regime be based on:-
(1) The Memorandum of December 29th, 1998, which was a call by NDA to enter
into the option of a peaceful settlement for the Sudanese Cause. The NDA
references for a negotiation process are NDA Charter, the Asmara Resolutions of
the Fundamental Issues Conference, and Resolutions of the NDALC in June 1995.
(2) The government refused to receive the Memorandum of December 29, 1998. It
refused all possibilities of talks with the NDA delegates. Therefore, before
any negotiations are considered, the government must officially receive the
Memorandum
of the NDA. With this, government would be
announcing recognition of the NDA and the
NDA Partners.
Negotiations are normally conducted between equal partners. In fact, any
dialogue that takes place without these terms of equity is false. How can any
negotiation or dialogue takes place between partners of whom one is a ruling
regime that doesn't realize the other partner or is not restricted from making
the most horrific crimes against them?
(3) Negotiations must be prepared in a suitable and healthy climate. For this
purpose, the regime must take these steps:-
(+) The regime must admit it had illegally overthrown a legitimate rule on June
30th, 1989, and that it had confiscated democracy and public freedoms.
(+) The regime must abrogate the Tawali Law and allow public activity for
parties and organizations, in addition to freedom of unions, democracy and the
freedom of expression.
(+) Recognition of political pluralism, party life, and the NDA so that a
dialogue is undertaken between partners with equal rights.
(+) Release of all detainees and a commitment not to arrest any political
opponent.
(+) Dissolution of organs of repression and regime security.
(+) Government must announce it is prepared for prosecution before the
Judiciary for human rights violations and abuses of authority.
(4) Before the above-mentioned agenda are decided upon, any talk about a
National Conference or the assignment of a task force for a dialogue is
untimely.
(5) Alternatively, if the regime is committed to application of these necessary
measures to prepare the climate for achievement of a peaceful negotiable
settlement, the NDA on its part pledges to stop military operations and the use
of force.
(6) Any political agreement must be composed of 2 complementary parts:-
First: A constitutional part that is rigorously elaborated to act as a
Constitutional Charter to govern application of the peaceful settlement. This
consists of:-
- Issuance of an irrevocable Constitutional Declaration to replace the existing
constitution, Tawali Law, and all of the legislating that restricted public
freedoms. The Declaration shall guarantee rights and freedoms and principles of
democratic pluralism, including provisions of the Nairobi Communiqué,
Decentralization, and the Right to
Self-Determination.
- Agreement on a comprehensive just peace to end the Civil War on the
basis of
equal citizenship and the distribution of wealth, decentralization, etc.
- Reformulation of State organs on national terms and a consensus on
organization and leadership, etc.
- Consensus on setting up a National Constitutional Conference, the agenda, and
the time required for it.
- Publication of the trials made under the existing regime and the detection of
martyrs' graves.
- Restoration of public and private monies, personal honor, and compensation
and punishment for all crimes committed.
- This Constitutional Charter must be implemented by a Transitional Government
with a broad, convincing, and just representation of People.
Secondly: The other complementary part concerns the Transitional Government. It
includes the implementation of actions prescribed in the first part, including
the organization of a Constitutional Conference, regular duties of the State
concerning security, services, budget, reformation of foreign relations, etc.,
and the law-making of elections and plebiscite proceedings.
(5) No secrecy or hidden agenda. All facts must be announced to the People.
Negotiations must be transparently processed.
(6) We welcome any regional and international efforts to handle negotiations.
The Protected Uprising
On top of the questions relevant to the Uprising, two main questions
come to
the surface: The first concerns the possibility of an Uprising in essence, and
the other is related to the armed protection of the Uprising.
Concerning the first question, the Uprising option is often questioned as a
means to liquidate the NIF fascistic rule. Is this option reduced?
The objective perspective: Aside from frustration and strain, it is not
possible to rule out the Uprising option or to circumscribe chances of Uprising
occurrence even if the movement appears stagnant or that it fails to capture a
demonstration or opposition of the Masses. True, there are negative factors
that handicap the Uprising of which we mention:-
(1) Intimidation and repression. The Masses Movement surpassed this factor long
ago. Resurgence is evident in the political scene and features of a political
opposition imposed itself at home and overshadowed the authority media and
leaders announcements. (2) Different working styles of the political action
inside the country inhibited the translation of opposition activities into a
materialized organizational effort to prepare for the Uprising. (3) The lacking
in sufficient material support which supposedly is a function of Opposition
Forces Abroad. (4) Negative repercussions resulted from the talks on
reconciliation and consensus, disputes amongst the Opposition, exaggeration of
the role played by military action abroad all of which generated negative
expectations between the Masses, etc.
Furthermore, it is normal that varying assessments existed regarding the
resurgence of Masses, the extent of Uprising preparations, Peoples' readiness,
etc. Also true is the fact that life is unbearable under the brunt of NIF
regime. But the change of this state of affairs requires basic conditions of
which organized work among the Masses with a plan of work is most important.
Organized work at home is the foundation. Encouragement of any popular
protesting, minute as it might be, is significant. Certainly, the promotion of
military action abroad is necessary to break the will of the regime and to
reduce its repressive abilities.
In general, we are not calling for a specific date for the Uprising or for
overthrowing of the regime. We believe it is not possible to do that calling in
any sense. As an alternative, there are factors that support the option of
Uprising. Chief among these are the increases in workers' strikes and the
threats of workers to make collective resignations from work to protest the
default of authority in salaries. At the same time, there are increases in the
attacks on government's unions and the unions' laws and regulations. This is an
approach adopted by Unions' Movement to retrieve the unions' independence and
rights; as well the protests by farmers against costs of production, debts, and
lower prices, their refusal of Gezira Scheme privatization, etc.
In truth, the general direction of this Movement is protesting authority
policies in specific issues and certain demands. This provided the way for the
Masses to resolve the urgent problems. This Movement has not yet advanced to an
overall political protest against the regime. It is difficult to suggest a
scenario at this point of time or a designed framework to develop the movement.
In students campus, the political attitude is much clearer: There is an
intensity of students' podiums for symposiums, engagements, elections,
scuffles, exchanged violence with authority organizations, etc.
The political resurgence at home resurrected the organizations that signed the
NDA Charter, as well as new organizations working to join the NDA. Here we
point that our Party suggested the NDA must be broadened to accommodate all
different forms and levels of struggle at home in consideration of the fact
that there is discontentment among large sections of People with performance of
the NDA, in addition to the need to respond positively to new organizations.
Also, we do not exclude the resort of authority to frustrate this mass
resurgence with counterattacks such as announcements of unions' elections,
changing some faces, etc., or by making a law on mass activities to restrict
the Masses protest.
These, if legislated, will only make a temporary effect since the Protest
Movement has already entrenched itself even if a law is made to repress it. In
accordance with this, we view the Memorandum of December 29th, 1998. The
Memorandum and the ensuing revival at home constituted a quality shift in the
NDA struggles versus NIF dictatorship. We can summarize some of the
characteristics of this shift as follows:-
(=) The Memorandum revealed the high potential available for masses political
work at home, despite of the regime. The signatures of the Memo ascertained the
possibilities of a wide unionist movement in collaboration with the NDA, added
to the Women's Movement and the increase in national leadership.
(=) The timing of the Memo, the form it took, and the resulting activities
achieved a political success and paved the way for new forms of political work
at home. This confused the regime and paralyzed its repressive ability.
(=) The activities initiated by the Memo can be used as a lifting machine for
Masses struggle in and outside Sudan to contribute to the preparatory work of
the Uprising. In our opinion, this requires:-
- Continuity of attacks to reinforce the Uprising as a core tactic of the
Opposition Abroad. The development and advancement of military action and the
resistance of any attempt to disintegrate NDA unity or reduce efficiency or
status and role of the NDA are parts of this strategy.
- Our position Abroad is based on the fact that NDA at home endeavors to widen
up the scope of its movement to make a broad political mobilization that will
break the grip of authority's encroachment. The NDA at home runs its own work
according to modalities suggested and implemented by it. We struggle from
Abroad to enable NDA at home to accomplish its own plan of action.
- Cooperation and coordination between NDA other Partners based on support for
the Memo away from any reconciliation tendencies with the regime, in accordance
with the obligation towards organized and institutionalized work within the
unity of the NDA.
- Encouragement and reinforcement of all Sudanese organizations abroad
(communities, unionists, associations, human rights organizations, etc.) in a
way that utilizes the climates established by the Memo to combat the regime by
restoration of democracy and public freedoms, and the overwhelming of regime's
organs of repression.
The other question is concerned with the Concept of Protection. Why an Uprising
protected with arms? How is this protection made?
First: The National Islamic Front closed all doors on the face of any political
or social movement by the Masses apart from NIF framework and domination. The
NIF pushed the People of The Sudan into an arena and tools of its own choice.
The NIF alone is held responsible for the results of all this in the
contemporary history of Sudanese politics. The NIF isolated itself as a
political group and ruled out the possibility of reconciliation because it has
persistently adopted intimidation as a system and strategy. The NIF diminished
all functions of State in acts of repression and capital-accumulation by
stealing the Public Sector and wealth of the country, continuity of
loot-and-burn policy under the banner of Jihad and ethno-religious arrogance,
legalization of institutional corruption and parasitic richness for NIF leaders
and cadres, attempts to destroy Sudan social fabric according to NIF narrow
ideological concepts, etc.
Secondly: Since 30th of June, 1989, NIF leaders continued to ignore all
peaceful calls to step aside. They refused to receive memorandums by the
Opposition. The head of NIF rule challenged the Opposition to fight him with
arms thus he motivated others to take arms against the regime.
Thirdly: The next alternative authority of Sudan will come into being according
to the method and style of changing the existing regime. Negotiable solutions
mean that the NIF will be the strongest part of the next alternative, which
means, in turn, a return to crisis square. A non-Masses way of changing the
authority, a military coup for instance, will mean expropriation of the
Uprising, patronage, and confiscation of democracy, which also means a return
to crisis square. The Masses way of changing the authority, whether peacefully
or by force, means a continuity to complete the Uprising agenda. This is why we
support the Masses broad activities to mark any armed work, the integrity of a
popular political struggle that is protected by armed popular struggles, and
the integrity of armed action abroad with political work at home. Because armed
struggle is an extension of political work, we continued to suggest the
completion and development of political unity by the unity of military forces.
Fourthly: The lively experience of Sudanese Masses' struggles during the
October Revolution 1964 and the April Uprising 1985 informed that a mere
overthrow of the regime does not necessarily mean completion of the Uprising
agenda. Therefore, it is expedient to protect Uprising from acts of
expropriation. The Uprising must be protected by armed Masses until the
alternative authority, as agreed by NDA, is finally established. If we really
want to uproot the NIF rule, a strong and broad mass action can only be
achieved via a Protected Uprising.
Fifthly: The political movement inside Sudan alone possesses full ability to
define details of the concept. And yet, the concept of protection in general
terms refers to the state of readiness among the Masses at home to protect the
Uprising not to wait for protection from abroad. This means that a definitive
program must be designated for the organized work of the Masses to build up the
tools of protection. The definition in question is not confined to political
leadership only. Large sections of the Masses must equally participate in
program designation. On the other side, protection is not handled by armed
groups as acting for or apart from the Masses Movement.
Protection is an organic extension of Masses Movement. The features of
protection and the entrenchment of the process of protection work in harmony
with the Masses Movement. Protection is also correlated with armed struggle
abroad within the integrity of both political and military work at home and
abroad. The armed force of Opposition Abroad is entrusted with a major task of
support, mobilization, media activities, provision of tools and means of
protection, and launching a gorilla war that is accurately targeted and
executed in coordination with the advancement of the political movement at
home.
Finally: Any upcoming change in The Sudan that will not shake the political,
social, and economic structure will continue to be incomplete and disfigured.
It will bear the possibility of a collapse. The April 1985 Charter, with the
context it had, would have helped to develop the Masses Movement to make a
qualitative change. It laid out general indicators for a new pattern of
democratic political exercise such as the proposal of a constitutional
conference, the national economic conference, the call to allow a greater
weight to enlightened areas and modern forces in parliament, etc.
This process, nonetheless, was not completed at that time due to the weak
revolutionary charge of the Uprising, the balance of forces, and the variables
of regional and international surroundings of Sudan. The completion of this
process will not come with wishful thinking. It will come about through a long
struggle that is the foundation of our viewpoint about the NDA. It also
constitutes the base to rally NDA forces in a subsequent stage made of 4 main
components:-
(1) The Masses mark of the process of change (the Uprising), whether peacefully
or with arms.
(2) Pluralism in the broadest meaning of the term to cover the political,
social, ethnic, cultural, and religious realities.
(3) A democracy that is correlated with the broad meaning of pluralism to be
exercised on Sudanese grounds to satisfy the basic needs of citizens
(subsistence).
(4) The role of marginal areas and the cause of peoples to attract pioneers of
these areas to enter into alliance with forces of the modern sector to solve
the Sudanese crisis. This framework will do away with the marginalization,
negligence, and injustices their regions suffer.
TASKS OF THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD
The reconstruction of a Sudanese modern state, the democratic civil state, and
the resurrection of life into the fabric of Sudanese society after years of
destruction and devastation requires a careful handling of the issue of
transitional rule as a fundamental concern, not as changes of authority organs.
In actual fact, the essence of the transitional period can be understood in
conjunction with the failure of the Democratic Project of The Sudan. The issue
surfaces after the failures of several transitions that never completed the
agenda. This is the responsibility of the Sudanese political movement:
(*) Post-independence > the first democratic government > crisis >
military
coup.
(*) The October Revolution > a year's transition > democracy in crisis
>
military coup.
(*) The April Uprising > a year's transition > democracy in crisis >
military
coup.
The next transition has a greater significance than the former transitions
because of the tragic dilemma our country is facing today. This is a dilemma
which began after independence. But it reached its climax under the existing
regime. We briefly mention features of the dilemma:-
(+) The unprecedented prevalence of terrorism, tyranny, and human rights
violations as never witnessed before, in addition to expansion of a devastating
civil war that pervaded the whole country ensuing in geometrical increases in
the handicapped victims of war and the displacement and refuge of thousands who
are searching for a home to secure their children in Canada, Australia,
Britain, New Zealand, USA, etc.
(+) Scarcity of the basic elements of life, the famine and begging for food,
and debasement of the middle class.
(+) Lacking in security and tranquility, child destitution, family breakdown,
corruption of the social fabric, fear of the future, brain drain and migration
of skilled cadres and the youth, etc.
(+) Imposition of a reactionary social scheme disguised in the name of
"restructuring society" and "the civilized scheme." This is
a scheme that
reflects the narrow-mindedness of ignoring the others, ethno-religious
arrogance, and the infliction of a vision of a single party on the country by
force. The premises of the scheme are based on dissemination of war culture,
killing, cruelty, women backwardness, superstition as a State culture
(marriages with paradise females, jin healing, monkeys and mines, etc.), and
the obliteration of arts and cultures heritage including the massacres of
Sudanese arts and singing, etc.
(+) Ascendancy of new parasitic strata, war nouveau riche, famine brokers, and
stealing of public monies.
The outcome of this tragic reality is:-
(x) A new form of alienation and estrangement with respect to the State, the
public sector, and the whole Sudanese entity. Her is the real danger!
(x) Inhibition of the role, growth, and development of modern forces in the
future of society.
(x) Deterioration of the city as a center of cultural and political
enlightenment.
(x) Extinction of civil society institutions, lack of confidence in parties,
and the retreat of citizens to tribal and lineage formations for security. This
possibly will disintegrate the State.
The confrontation of all these issues, added to the political, economic, legal,
security, and military measures, constitutes the core concerns of the
transition. These are issues that cannot be handled by a single party, two
parties, a majority coalition, or a military regime founded on a single
political organization. These are issues for the whole People to tackle in
freedom, without patronage or repression. They cannot be limited to political
leadership. They require the participation of the largest sections of qualified
cadres, regardless of their political affiliations, so far as the reference is
NDA Charter and Resolutions of the Fundamental Issues Conference.
The next transitional period must then be a new one in context. The machineries
of past democratic rule are not acceptable. Talking about criteria of the last
democratic experiment is unacceptable. These contributed to the crisis. People
have for a long time questioned the alternative of the Salvation regime. They
did not hurry to join the Opposition until after NDA's Fundamental Issues
Conference.
We assure our obligation and commitment to the NDA Charter and Resolutions of
the Fundamental Issues Conference which included: religion and politics,
self-determination, the form of rule, in addition to the tasks and functions of
the transitional period. Our commitment to the Charter and Resolutions of the
Fundamental Issues Conference are centered on our strategic position regarding
these issues. We briefly summarize our position as follows:-
(1) Separation of Religion from Politics
(+) Sudan is multi-religious with a Muslim majority, Christians, and African
beliefs. The tolerance and respect of religious beliefs is necessary to insure
equality of citizens since faith does not subscribe to the criterion and
relations of a majority with minorities. Here also is the need to recognize
religion as a constituent of the thought and sentiments of People of Sudan.
Essentially, there is rejection of any call that abrogate or debase the role of
religion in the life of individuals, the integrity of society's values,
spiritual practices, ethics, culture, and civilization.
(+) Although Sudan is multi-religious, it has always coexisted with a spirit of
tolerance and religious forgiveness until dictator Nimeiri imposed the
September Laws and made of himself an Imam via a false consensus. This led to
the prevalence of terrorism and fascism under the NIF present rule.
(+) The background of this objective reality is informative to the relation of
Sudanese democratic politics with religion based on principles of a pluralist
civil and political system of rule. This simultaneously makes our concept of
secularism. Our point here is that the concept of "civil order" is
closer to
our reality than the concept of "secular order" which is closely
correlated
with the European experiment. The principles are:-
- Equality in citizenship, freedom of belief and conscience irrespective of
religious beliefs.
- Equality of religions.
- People are source of authority and governance is legalized by constitution.
- The rule of law, independence of the judiciary, equality of citizens before
the law without discrimination by belief, race, or gender.
- Guarantees of the fundamental political, civil, economic, social, and
cultural rights and freedoms by the realization of international human rights
norms.
(+) Regarding legislation, the full commitment to the consensus of Sudanese
political movement on the Nairobi Communiqué' as issued on April 17th, 1993,
which states: "(1) International and regional human rights instruments and
covenants shall be an integral part of the laws of The Sudan and any law
contrary to the foregoing stipulation shall be null and void and
unconstitutional. (2) Laws shall guarantee full equality of citizens on the
basis of citizenship, respect for religious beliefs and traditions and without
discrimination on grounds of religion, race, gender or culture." According
to
these principles, scholarly work may interpret religion and customs as sources
of legislation together with thought and Sudanese judicial precedents.
(+) Realization of freedom of scientific and philosophical research and the
right to religious interpretation.
(2) The Right to Self-Determination:
We renew our commitment to the Fundamental Issues Conference on the right to
self-determination as a genuine, basic, and democratic right, a modality to put
an immediate end to civil war, and to facilitate the making of democracy,
peace, and development. We ascertain that after the consensus of Sudanese
political movement on these resolutions, a historic opportunity is available to
rebuild confidence, erect the road to unity as it begins with the removal of
this regime, and to setting up the alternative as agreed by NDA Charter and
Resolutions.
(+) We are with the unity of Sudan, one standing on voluntary choice,
democracy, and the free will of People: A nation established to restructure the
Sudanese State to incorporate the contexts of a pluralist, democratic, civil
and political rule, redressing justice in the distribution of authority and
development, and making a Sudanese identity that integrates the reality of the
multi-religions, multi-cultures, and multi-nations of our Homeland as a source
of cross-fertilization and enrichment for our Sudanese character, not a reason
for bitter and bloody conflicts.
(3) The Form of Governance in the Transition:
(+) The Resolutions of the Fundamental Issues Conference included a resolution
on governance which reads in Para (2): "The decentralized system of rule
shall
be based on the distribution of powers and functions, as agreed upon between
the Center, Northern Entities and the Southern Entity. Agreement as to the
names to be applied to those entities shall be reached subsequently." In
other
paragraphs, the Resolution concentrated on democracy of decentralized rule,
redressing injustices, and "gauging the wishes of the various areas as
regards
the evolving democratic process in the country." The Resolution stipulated
the
distribution of functions and powers between Center and regions with full
attention to the Southern Entity.
(+) In consideration of the Resolution's details, we believe they covered
several basic aspects:-
- Partners enjoy wide jurisdictions at the expense of the Center by virtue of a
broad democratic system of decentralization. This prepares the grounds for the
establishment of a New Sudan in which People enjoy security, peace, and social
welfare in a real unity based on their free will.
- The Resolution approximately incorporated all features of regional and
federal rule, in addition to considerable rules of confederacy with regard to
special arrangements for the South.
- The Resolution observed the issue of wealth distribution, national
identification, and native cultures, added to the obligations conferred on the
Center.
(+) We are of the opinion that this Resolution concerning governance in
transitional rule did observe the concerns of all political forces. It
constituted a solid base upon which the Sudanese political movement united such
that it is indeed inappropriate to replenish a new debate on federalism or
confederacy.
(+) Regarding the transition's constitutional structure, we are committed to
the relevant provisions in the NDA Charter: Parliamentary republic led by a
head of state council with sovereignty powers only, to be constituted of any
number as agreed upon, with a permanent or a periodical chairmanship. All NDA
signers of the Charter are partners represented in organs of government:
sovereignty council, legislature, and council of ministers. Our mind is open
for consensus on any details based on these fixations.
(4) The Constitutional Conference:
(=) We do not start from zero. Prior to the overthrow of Nimeiri's
dictatorship, features of a Constitutional Conference had been initially
suggested as a tool to resolve the crisis. It was a first step to salvage Sudan
following overthrow of the May junta. Within a short while, the idea occupied
the political front as a major component of the Uprising Charter. The idea also
crystallized in the course of the preparatory process to convene the conference.
Actually, we were aware with the other political forces of the urgent need to
expedite the conference as it was initially scheduled in September 1989. At
that particular time, the Islamic Front, also a member of the preparatory
committee of the conference, staged the coup that disrupted conference's
schedule. Notwithstanding, a constitutional conference will certainly take
place with the return of democratic rule upon overthrow of the NIF
dictatorship.
(+) It is not possible to reduce the National Constitutional Conference to a
discussion meeting with the aim of dividing up the authority. The conference is
much bigger than that. First, it recognizes the reality of diversity and
pluralism of Sudan concerning the political, ethnic, cultural, and religious
structures, and the existence of real injustices in the marginal areas.
Secondly, it is concerned with the construction of a new Sudanese modern State
with a constitution, laws, and forms of governance observing diversity of the
country. Thirdly, it takes care of the need to eradicate the roots of civil
war, the making and keeping of peace, and the stabilization of Sudan's unity by
the free will of People, not by force. Therefore, the agenda of the
Constitutional Conference include the form of State, the future of government,
religion and State, uneven development, the just distribution of wealth,
national identification and culture, and all of the other provisions of a
permanent constitution.
(+) The National Constitutional Conference must not be confined to political
parties. It must accommodate the other sectors of society, unions,
associations, farmers, women, youth, students, human rights organizations,
chiefs of tribes and clans, groups concerned with the problems of marginal
areas, etc. The conference must be widely covered by information media. The
issues it discusses should be broadly disseminated among the Masses, including
those in villages and nomads places. All this ascertains the fact that the
constitutional conference will not achieve its targets unless it is convened in
a democratic free climate to observe the fundamental rights and freedoms of
People.
For these reasons, we continued to affirm that there is no way to hold a
constitutional conference under the present dictatorial rule of Sudan. Any
proceeding will circumscribe the complete form of representation which is a
basic term to convene the conference without any marginal attitude towards
partners. Based on this, we affirm our commitment to the NDA Charter that a
Constitutional Conference be held in a period not exceeding 6 months of
transitional rule inauguration.
(+) In our assessment, the Constitutional Conference will complete in detail
the agreement of the Asmara Fundamental Issues Conference June 1995 as agreed
by political parties, unions, and military forces. The agreement shall not be
abrogated by any constitutional conference but it will be developed and
completed as large sections of the Sudanese Masses rally around it.
(5) Foreign Relations:
We believe that Sudan must maintain balanced foreign relations with all States
away from any ideological tendencies, non-interference in the internal affairs
of other countries, observance of mutual interests with nations, and commitment
to interests of the People of The Sudan. Relations with Egypt will continue as
a strategic issue, so with Eritrea. Distinctive relations must be maintained
with all neighboring States and the Red Sea countries.
We assure that the best we can give to Africa and the Arab region is a united
and stable Sudan
that bridges Africa with the Arab World. Under the existing regime's most
strategic agenda, Sudan will continue to threaten stability of the Region as it
is made a base for an international fundamentalist movement to overthrow the
social orders of our neighboring countries.
May 1999
CPS