The Sudanese crisis is not temporary or casual but a deep national crisis which had several implications on the overall political, social economic and spiritual life. It is in fact a chronic crisis dating back to the dawn of independence, but escalated gradually and became more complicated as a result of the imperfect solutions and the subsequent failure of the social forces that formed the successive military and civil ruling regimes over more than four decades.
The present National Islamic Front (NIF) regime is a consequent outcome and a clear manifestation of this crisis. It has taken the crisis in question to its extreme using Islam as an ideological disguise for religious and racial supremacy to escalate the civil war and allow a group of its leeches to systematically rob the country’s resources at the expense of the masses’ standard of living, health and education.
The relationship between the NIF regime and the crisis is also manifested in the similarity between the NIF programs and the nature of the crisis itself. This relationship is, in turn, manifested by the fact that the NIF sought to incessantly constitute itself as a state rather than as ruling political party. Therefore, the power struggle between the NIF factions is not unexpected. The power struggle between Al-Turabi and Al-Basheer reflects the multiple crisis of the regime: the crisis of the nature and structure of totalitarian regimes in general, the increasing crisis as a result of the failure of the NIF project, the regime’s oppressive and terrorist practices and the use of both the public money and the state apparatus to serve the purposes of the NIF membership.
The rift within the NIF is in fact a struggle over power and power-related gains between two distinctive factions: a dominant faction enjoying the power privileges but rebellious towards the directives of the organization; another faction looking forward to enjoying these privileges but does not have a direct control over power. The later faction seeks to dominate –as a party- the former. Both factions stick to the declared fundamental programs related to Islamic fundamentalism and the establishment of theocracy even if the strict restrictions are relaxed when it is necessary. By getting the army involved in the NIF internal factions feud coupled with the threats of a confrontation between militias loyal to the feuding factions, this conflict reached the point of no return and has already become a real danger threatening the Sudan and its people. Therefore, the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) requirements of preparing the atmosphere for negotiation are no longer meant to only pave the way for any future negotiations, but also to protect the Sudan and the Sudanese people. We do agree with the point of view that any rift within the NIF regime will have positive results as to the struggle of the mass movement. We do also agree with the point of view that it is necessary to extend this rift. However, we disagree with idea that this extension would come through by supporting Al-Basheer; Al-Turabi and Al-Basheer are two faces of the same coin.
When some, including the NIF and its allies, accuses the Sudanese Communist Party (CPS) of not being interested in a peaceful solution to the Sudanese crisis, they are in fact intending to formulate this solution in accordance with their own interests and desires. The CPS would like to clearly state here that it is not sufficient to just remove the NIF from power and replace it with a new administration if we really do want to put an end to this crisis in accordance with the trend of a comprehensive rebuilding of a new Sudan. It has become absolutely necessary to dismantle the ruling authority itself, cleanse its apparatus from the committed crimes and bring to trial all those responsible. We also do believe that the decisions of Asmara Conference (1995) represent a suitable basis and a commonly agreed minimum to carry out this rebuilding. Any serious and keen approach to solve this crisis should necessarily start with acknowledging the very presence of the crisis itself together with the necessary need to radically solve it if we really do want to save the Sudan from an imminent destruction. Peaceful solution involves negotiations, which never takes place without recognizing the parties involved. Negotiation, in fact, should start with both recognizing its necessity and declaring commitment to its results.
What we have come to so far, as far as the peaceful solution of the Sudanese crisis is concerned, is a result of the collective efforts and the common will of all NDA parties and the popular opposition including the national figures and friends of the Sudan especially Libya and the IGAD group. The popular opposition has, thus, become an effective force able to obtain victory through the common will and efforts of the masses and their leadership both in the Sudan and in exile. Here comes the legitimate demand of preparing the atmosphere before starting any negotiations, because the Sudanese people has the right to fully and genuinely take part in any dialogue about its future and fate and to follow up with full attention and alert any such negotiations. The demand of preparing the atmosphere before any negotiations is not more than providing the freedom of meeting, organization, expression and movement in order for the Sudanese people to practice its right in taking part in any dialogue concerning its future.
In the battle of the peaceful political solution the NIF regime uses all its available abilities: the authority apparatus, its international relations, the wealth and resources of the country, the regular armed forces, the other paramilitary and security forces, the intelligence as well as its internal and external media network. Meanwhile, the abilities of the NDA are comparatively far more less. By sticking to the demand of preparing the atmosphere for negotiation, we are in fact interested in testing the seriousness of the NIF regime. As for the democratic freedoms we are demanding, they actually represent only a tiny part of what should be achieved by negotiation –if it proves to be successful- with regard to rights and freedoms. Fulfilling the necessary requirements of preparing the atmosphere for negotiation cannot simply be reduced to mere statements by president of the regime or its foreign minister. Nor could they be confined in the interpretations of the regime leaders because trust in the regime is already lacking.
Therefore, we believe that the present NIF regime should officially announce the necessary measures and arrangements to fulfil the requirements of these demands; only then will the NDA take another step towards the process of negotiation with the NIF regime. From the other hand, as long as the NIF regime maintains its oppression and terror as represented in the secret services, the pro-regime militias and the oppressive laws, it is not irrational that the NDA sticks to its other declared options including the popular uprising and armed struggle.
We disagree with point of view that the Egypto-Libyan initiative could replace the IGAD’s, unless the former aims to divide the opposition into northern and southern and reiterate the so-called confrontation between an Arab Muslim north and an African Christian south. This is exactly what the NIF regime and some regional circles are calling for in order to reduce the peaceful and democratic solution into a mere reconciliation between the present ruling regime and the northern opposition first, then move on to look for a solution to the “southern problem”, war and peace. It is obvious that paving the way for this option starts with dismantling the NDA instead of dismantling the NIF totalitarian regime and restoring democracy. Unfortunately, the decisions taken recently by the Umma Party represent a practical step serving this particular purpose.
The differences with the Umma Party are not over structural or organizational issues, but essentially over assessing the developments on the political scene. Regarding what the Umma Party tends to continuously repeat about recognizing only the NDA-Sudan, we do believe that the NDA is one and only one entity whether inside or outside the Sudan. It is not possible, of course, to either talk about any contradiction between the two, or that the NDA-Sudan will, for instance, be in charge of the “political solution” dossier in isolation from its leadership in exile. We have to take into full consideration the fact that some factions are either not represented in the NDA-Sudan or underrepresented such as the Sudan People Liberation Movement (SPLM), Alliance Forces, the Federal Alliance.. etc. It should not be expected that we respond to the condition of Umma Party concerning its membership in the NDA-Sudan, because alliances are never based on dictating conditions, but on the general and common agreement on views and objectives as accepted voluntarily by all the parties.
To conclude, the CPS believes it is necessary that the political and mass movement continue its activity making use of any possible ease of the applied oppressive laws and restrictions, however limited it is, so as to restore its relation with the masses and in order not to give up to expectation and awaiting. Such an activity requires organizing a political action abroad prompting the mass movement inside to stick to unity and providing it with the necessary support.